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PROLOGUE 
 
 
At the 2001 PAC Conference at Sunningdale, Peter Barberis  provided the 
following abstract to his paper on civil society, virtue and trust: 
 
“Laments about the decline of public morality and the public service ethos 
have found expression across the political spectrum.  The age of modernity 
(or post-modernism) makes more difficult, though not impossible, the 
maintenance of a civil society in which ‘virtue’ and ‘trust’ feed the public 
service ethos….Governments have, among other things, applied 
indiscriminately the ‘heavy’ regulatory regimes to deal with impropriety, in the 
process stifling the public service ethos.” 
 
This paper, also given at the PAC conference, has been recast in the light of the 
Barberis comments.    It deals in particular with the ambiguous role played by one 
“heavy regulatory regime” and the complex relationships developed between this 
anti-corruption agency, the various governments in power after its creation and 
(only incidentally) with the modernisation of the police service in Queensland. 
 
The story of the modernisation of the Queensland police service is a remarkable 
one, involving as it does the disgrace and imprisonment of Police Commissioner 
Terry Lewis and – on unrelated corruption charges – several Ministers.  This was 
linked to the disgrace of a Premier of one government linked to both events, whose 
party subsequently plunged to electoral defeat in 1989 after thirty years in office.   
 
More recently (February, 2001), Queensland has seen the resignation of a Deputy 
Premier and several Ministers of the opposing party after admitting electoral rorting 
associated with fraud and perjury.  Apparently paradoxically, the party then went 
immediately to an election where it won a victory of unprecedented proportions. 
 
The common feature has been the impact of a judicial enquiry between 1987 and 
1989 and the activities generated by the supervisory body created by that enquiry, 
the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC).    This paper is in two parts – the first deals 
with the political context and administrative changes over the past decade and the 
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second focuses specifically on the operation of the Criminal Justice Commission 
within that context and its role in promoting modernisation of the police force. 
 
The stimulus to the initial enquiry, colloquially known as the Fitzgerald enquiry, was 
a series of newspaper and television revelations.  The producer of the key 1987 
programme has remained an interested observer of Queensland events.  
 
"It is easy to forget how crook it was.  A few spivs were running the police 
force in a de facto way from Brisbane’s Fortitude Valley (a sleazy inner 
suburb).    One is now doing life for heroin trafficking.  I came to the story 
because of a cri de coeur from a decent policeman who was being press-
ganged into a career with the other side.    He did not want to be corrupted… 
There are complaints from Queensland that the police force is still a troubled 
one.  One official came up with the quote of the century:   'Terry Lewis might 
have been a crook but at least he knew how to run a police force.' " 
 
 Add as footnote 
(Chris Masters, “Corruption and Reporting Corruption in Australia”, 
CBPA, no 68, March 1992) 
 
 
. 
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THE POLITICS OF ADMINISTRATIVE MODERNISATION 
 
 
1. Policing and the Political Culture of Queensland 
 
 
The bulk of political and economic power in Australia is located in the triangle linking 
Sydney, Melbourne and Canberra.  Queensland and the relatively empty Northern 
Territory are more outward focussed towards Australia's northern neighbours.  
Darwin, for example, is much further away from Canberra or Brisbane than it is from 
Indonesia and particularly from East Timor where Australian military and police are 
actively engaged.   Queensland shares a very narrow and permeable sea border 
with Papua New Guinea, connected by a chain of islands it administers  in the 
Torres Strait.   
 
Queenslanders have a strong sense of sub-state regional identity but as a whole 
they join with particular fervour in the national antipathy towards the federal capital 
and all who live there in splendid isolation from "the real world".  It is a state which 
has always been a bastion of conservatism of whatever nominal partisan label is 
applied (including the Australian Labor Party).  Two decades ago there was a body 
of literature which addressed the question of whether Queenslanders are 
significantly different from the inhabitants of other States1.  This  focused on issues 
such as the effect of the decentralisation of the State, rural fundamentalism, lower 
standards of education and a history of authoritarian governments  
 
The key characteristics relevant to policing in Queensland include the physical and 
social geography as well as this political culture.  It is easy even in Brisbane to lose 
the sense of perspective associated with the size and diversity of a state which has 
always seen itself and been considered by others as a "maverick".   The 
Queensland Police Service comprises over 11,000 staff, of whom 7000 are police 
officers.  To give an image for a British audience of the geographical scale of  the 
operation of the single police authority based in Brisbane, consider the following:   If 
Sunningdale was Brisbane, the police headquarters in Berkshire would have its 
northern regional headquarters in the Orkneys and its most distant stations within 
that region in both Iceland and Poland. 
 
 
The police and public bureaucracies operate in a political environment and it is 
necessary to trace the development of relationships between the political system 
and the public service over the past decade in order to understand the specific 
aspects of the operation of the anti-corruption agency known as the Criminal Justice 
Commission. (CJC).   
 
 
                                            
1 See, for example, Charlton, P, State of Mind: Why Queensland’s Different, Methuen 
Haynes, 1983. 
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2. Public Sector Management under the Bjelke-Petersen Regime 
 
The politics of Queensland were dominated in the 1970's and 1980's by the 
presence of a Premier who adopted an authoritarian, ultra-conservative style which 
appealed to the rural electorate.  The Country Party later changed its name to the 
National Party, both nationally and in each state, in an attempt to broaden its 
electoral appeal beyond a shrinking rural base, but its new title has made little 
difference in the long run to its core support in Queensland.  Premier Joh Bjelke-
Petersen initially headed a Coalition (with the city-based Liberal Party) but later was 
able to build on his anti-Canberra ideology and business-oriented public policies to 
govern in his own right.  
 
Halligan and Power have argued that during this era Queensland administrations 
had assumed many of the characteristics of what they termed the ‘bureaucratist’ 
type of government: 
 
A government was in power that was sensitive to the interests of subordinate 
staff, developed structures and cultures that reinforced this relationship and 
relied on the political support of employees to remain in office.2 
 
 
3. The collapse of the Bjelke-Petersen regime 
 
The government held its credibility with the rural sector in part through its highly 
moralistic stance on issues such as abortion, censorship and authoritarian 
crackdowns on dissent.  In the second half of the 1980s  Bjelke-Petersen became 
preoccupied by a desire to move to federal politics, effectively leaving the Deputy 
Premier, Bill Gunn, in control in Queensland in his absence.  Following the claims of 
police corruption in the State mentioned above, Gunn established, in 1987, a 
Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and Associated Misconduct 
(afterwards known as the Fitzgerald Inquiry).   The Fitzgerald Inquiry detected 
corruption deep within the government as well as the police force.  Its findings 
resulted in the jailing of the police commissioner and two ministers, the disgrace of 
Bjelke-Petersen, and a sweeping agenda for change designed to prevent the 
recurrence of such institutionalised corruption. 
 
The National Party’s evident exhaustion and lack of inspiration had resulted in 
progress by the Labor Party at an earlier election; the scandals gave them an easy 
opportunity to seize power, with every hope of entrenching their position.  There had 
been a considerable demographic change over the years, especially as the south-
east corner had become a magnet for inward migration from other States and there 
was an increasing population drift from the bush to the city.  This might have been 
expected to change voting patterns even without the corruption scandal and the 
ALP’s own change of leadership which had emphasised its commitment to 
                                            
2 Halligan, J, and Power, J, Political Management in the 1990s, Oxford University 
Press, Melbourne, 1992, p 165. 
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modernisation, but the Fitzgerald Report made it inevitable.  
 
 
4. Public Sector Management under Goss : Changing the People 
 
The Labor Party’s relatively young leader, Wayne Goss,  took office in the aftermath 
of the corruption scandal, with the general expectation that the government would 
establish proper processes designed to ensure democratic accountability within the 
State.  The Fitzgerald Report had examined the administrative processes of the 
State and made a number of recommendations in relation to them.  One of the most 
significant was the establishment of a Criminal Justice Commission (CJC), originally 
intended to have a limited-term existence.  The CJC was given extensive powers in 
relation to both the Police Service and more general official misconduct, including 
that of ministers and other politicians.3 
 
 
The reforms proceeded under Labor with the establishment of a number of new 
processes including an Electoral and Administrative Reform Commission, a more 
coherent parliamentary committee system, improved Cabinet processes designed 
to secure accountability and wider debate and a program of legislative reform.  
 
The Report had also commented: 
 
It is undesirable to leave reform to those people who are steeped in the 
previous philosophies and policies and who would no doubt find it difficult to 
willingly and cooperatively adopt an objective approach to the issue of 
reform.4 
 
As part of this process the Labor Party brought into the public service a number of 
academics with backgrounds in government and public administration, since the 
Party was suspicious of the capacity and motivation of existing senior officers 
appointed under the long-serving previous regime.  (The present author moved from 
being a Vice-Chancellor to serve as Director-General of Education).  
 
Goss used these people to carry through a significant agenda of reform but he 
failed to keep in touch with the party’s grass roots support, especially among 
modernising elements within the public service.   This flaw  eventually proved fatal 
to his own leadership.  He surrounded himself in central agencies and on Ministerial 
staff with inexperienced partisan advisers who shared his scepticism about the 
capacities of the public service.  Many who started off as advisers were entrenched 
in senior roles within the service itself.  It seemed to those within the system that the 
new government was treating its public service as an enemy, rather than 
recognising the goodwill that most within the public service initially had towards the 
new administration.  
                                            
3  The CJC is discussed later in this paper, in particular its stormy relationship with successive 
governments. 
 
4 Commission of Inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and Associated Police 
Misconduct, Report, Brisbane, 1989. 
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5.  The Managerialist Agenda :  Changing the Structure 
 
There was however a more positive side to the change of regime, a desire to 
modernise and create a new climate within the bureaucracy which rewarded merit 
and achievement.  Goss came to government with a commitment to introduce a 
more efficient administration (if need be, at the expense of a social policy agenda 
more central to the party's formal commitment to a  socialist ideology). 
 
A Public Sector Management Commission (PSMC) was established.  It set public 
sector standards in relation to areas such as equal employment opportunity and 
merit selection.  One effect of the equity agenda was to generate friction with senior 
departmental officers by restricting their autonomy in personnel selection matters 
through the imposition of accountability standards and requirements for central 
agency representation on selection committees.  These changes had the effect of 
weakening the traditional role of seniority in appointments and incidentally opening 
up opportunities for women applicants.  This affronted many male public servants, 
teachers and police officers, who saw their career prospects being diminished by 
new competitors. 
 
The activities of the Review Division were even more controversial.  Every 
department was subjected to a searching review dominated by central agency 
agendas.  The process tended to feed a growing sense of alienation in the public 
service, a public service which on the whole had welcomed the change of 
government but then found itself destabilised and increasingly demoralised by the 
process of restructuring that usually followed these reviews. 
 
6. The Electoral Backlash against Goss 
 
The electoral cycle is abnormally short in Queensland, with a maximum 
parliamentary term of three years.  When the Goss government went to the polls for 
the second time since its ascent to power, its fortunes were waning and it came 
perilously close to defeat.  The election held on 15 July 1995 defied widespread 
expectations that Labor would be returned comfortably.  Goss was returned with a 
single seat majority having been returned comfortably in 1992.   
 
The backlash against the government was partly a result of disappointed interest 
groups that had expected a more responsive social policy agenda, such as the 
Greens.  The press was alienated by the Goss campaign which was too stage-
managed and aloof.  But the loss of public service goodwill also had a considerable 
amount to do with the strong protest vote. 
  
There followed a period of high volatility in the political process, which will not be 
described in detail as it related essentially to issues beyond the bureaucracy.  The 
single seat majority was overturned as a result of a challenge in the electoral court 
which forced a by-election.  The by-election was distinguished by remarkably inept 
behaviour by the Labor machine:  it decided it needed a more attractive candidate 
to be sure of winning and dumped the incumbent (who was a former Minister).  In 
 
Austrian paper : draft       7 
the absence of a suitable sinecure, he then displayed his vindictiveness by standing 
as an independent and splitting the Labor vote. 
 
The Mundingburra by-election was a hard fought, dirty campaign, during which the 
seeds of later troubles for the about-to-be Coalition government were sown.  In 
particular a Memorandum of Understanding was signed by three key members of 
the future Coalition government, the future Premier, Treasurer and Police Minister 
and the Police Union.  As is discussed in detail later, the MOU gave undertakings 
that included dismissal of the Commissioner and several members of his senior 
management team.  When Labor lost the by-election, the balance of power passed 
into the hands of a single independent whose conservative policy preferences led 
her to support the restoration of a conservative coalition led by Rob Borbidge. 
 
  
 
7.  The Public Service under Borbidge 
 
The new government sought to establish a working relationship with a public service 
which had helped secure its election, albeit with an unstable and wafer-thin majority.  
Coalition leaders knew that they had a relatively brief period to win an aura of 
competence with the voting public which had thrust them into office almost as an 
unintended consequence of wishing to punish the Goss government’s perceived 
arrogance.    
 
Two forces intervened despite Borbidge’s best intentions.  First there was a 
commitment on the part of the urban elements in the coalition to the sort of 
privatisation reforms commonly listed on the agenda of the New Public 
Management.  Second, there was an expectation that the spoils should go to the 
victors and those senior officials dismissed under Goss were rehabilitated.  The 
wheel had turned full circle, with the new government reaching deep into the bowels 
of the bureaucracy to punish or reward its opponents and supporters.   There was 
no sense of apology and no justification needed, since it was asserted that this 
merely replicated the behaviour of Labor.  It felt like the return of the Bourbons and 
Borbidge lasted an equally short time. 
 
The perception that Borbidge’s government was running for cover,  particularly over 
the MOU with the Police Union,  became just one of a number of issues which 
helped undermine Borbidge's narrow hold on power.  The impact of other political 
issues, not central to this theme, created an environment of growing dissatisfaction 
and also tension between the coalition partners.    
 
In 1998, the Coalition’s already reduced mandate to govern was tested in an 
election campaign distinguished by a lack of serious issues and an emphasis on the 
personalities of the two leadership teams.  The result was a narrow but at least 
ultimately decisive win for Labor under Peter Beattie, who had displaced Goss after 
the latter’s defeat. 
 
 
8.  Public Service Life After Borbidge – Continuity or Change? 
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 Beattie came to power in 1998, at first dependent like Borbidge before him, on the 
vote of a single (but different) independent.  Beattie pursued a similar policy of 
wholesale changes in departmental heads, removing almost all of the Borbidge 
appointees immediately; only four (out of 18) CEO’s who had served under both 
Goss and Borbidge survived the successive changes of regime. Indeed cynics 
argued that some of Beattie’s appointments owed their posts not to merit, but 
entirely to the fact that they had been dismissed by Borbidge.  Others suggested 
that merit itself had been redefined in terms of partisan identification. This upheaval, 
which had been heavily criticised when generated by Goss and Borbidge, passed 
with remarkably little public criticism.  
 
It now appears that there is universal and bi-partisan acceptance of the proposition 
that a new Minister is entitled to choose his or her CEO, irrespective of whether or 
not there is a current incumbent and on the basis of applying widely differing 
measures of merit.  The only public disputation in Queensland has been about 
whether the length of the contractual period should be fixed or related to the tenure 
in office of a particular government.  Opinion has now shifted to a unanimous view 
that contract periods should only be for three years, effectively the maximum life of 
a single government. 
   
 
 
9.  Beattie's Strategy for a Landslide – Disown Your Party  
 
The spectre of Mundingburra in Townsville came back to haunt the Labor Party 
when factional infighting for endorsement to fight that seat spilled over into a 
conviction for fraud against party activists.   In order to solve other forms of "rorting" 
the endorsement plebiscite process, the Labor Party, unlike the opposition parties, 
had required evidence of presence on the local electoral roll before granting voting 
rights to members.  
 
 It emerged that party activists indulged in shady practices during 1996 involving 
false addresses and fraudulently registered memberships on the electoral roll.  
Enough evidence came to light to require police action and ultimately a conviction of 
a young candidate who then tipped a very public bucket on the practices of the 
entire party and specifically of some of its most prominent members. 
 
Throughout 2000, the escalating range of accusations led Beattie to invite the CJC 
to conduct its own investigations in order to reassure the public and allow him to 
"root out all the grubs".  The CJC chose to "contract out" the task to a judge, Justice 
Sheppersen, and his protracted investigations, public hearings and preliminary 
findings produced a surge of publicity equal to the highest dramas of Fitzgerald or 
the Police MOU. The outcome this time was startlingly different from those events. 
 
Beattie seized the initiative and forced a rigorous purge of ministers, MP’s and 
candidates whose claims to endorsement were tainted by their past behaviour and 
then called an election slightly earlier than was necessary.  He went into the 
campaign perceived to be taking a large gamble that he personally would be 
dissociated by the voters from the "grubs" within his own organisation.  
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. The opposition parties were in total disarray because the Nationals were aware 
from earlier elections that their heartland support was under threat from the further 
Right, the xenophobic, racist and protectionist ideology of Hansen's One Nation.  
This party had proved a shambles in terms of the parliamentary processes but 
enjoyed support perceived to be growing in rural areas.  
 
 The Nationals moved to an accommodation and dragged their coalition partners 
along, much to the detriment of the Liberals who were wholly forsaken by urban 
middle class voters embarrassed by the rural red-necks.   In the last week of the 
campaign, self-preservation instincts led Nationals collectively to disown their own 
leader and try to win over wavering support from rural element leaning towards One 
Nation.    
 
Beattie romped home in a landslide, winning 65 of the 87 seats; the National Party 
was reduced to only 11 members of parliament and the Liberal Party to three, equal 
in number to One Nation and to the independents.  A CJC inquiry on this occasion 
had collected a lot of prominent scalps but the Chief had emerged all-powerful, with 
a large increase in the tribe of loyal Indians. 
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THE EVOLVING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CJC, THE GOVERNMENT 
AND THE POLICE 
 
  
 
1.   The Police Service Under Goss  
 
The Fitzgerald Report had identified an unhealthily close relationship between the 
then Premier and the Police.  After Fitzgerald, a greater effort was made to secure 
bipartisan support for the appointment of seasoned professionals as 
Commissioners.  The first of these was appointed from outside Queensland.   His 
short reign was plagued by his failure to adjust to an untrusting environment and he 
was ensnared in another CJC investigation relating to misuse of his travel 
entitlements.   His replacement, a local who had served as an investigator with 
Fitzgerald proved a timely replacement and a long-term success but it was still a 
poor start to the tricky relationship between Police and the CJC. 
  
Despite this, the Queensland Police Service was fundamentally changed after the 
Fitzgerald Report.   The Labor government significantly increased the level of 
resources allocated to the police portfolio.  The increased resources were directed 
principally towards rapidly rising police numbers, and providing the infrastructure to 
support them.  Indeed, increasing the number of police in Queensland became the 
political mantra in Queensland throughout the 1990s.  The entry standards for 
recruits rose rapidly and the content of the Police Service’s education and training 
programs reflected the new emphasis on ethics. 
 
In 1993, the Police Service was reviewed by the Public Sector Management 
Commission, which focussed on its administration and administrative structures.   It 
was a difficult period for the Police Service. Police cultures are notoriously resistant 
to change.  Many officers who had been comfortable under the old administration 
were resistant to the reforms taking place. The older officers found themselves 
supervising young officers who more likely to question the assumptions of their 
seniors.    
 
By the end of the 1990s, the image of the Police Service was sufficiently attractive 
for it to be able to fill all vacancies from graduates (although for reasons of social 
and age mix, this never happened in practice).  Physical entry requirements were 
varied, and specific advertising conducted, to encourage women to join.  By the end 
of the decade, a year's intake approached the goal of a 50:50 gender balance.   
The promotion process was linked to a merit system in which advancement related 
to achievements in a systematic preservice and inservice training programme, 
including the option of further tertiary study.   
 
The entrenched culture may have persisted in the middle ranks, particularly 
amongst those who believed their career expectations had been significantly 
reduced.   Nevertheless there had been a dramatic shift in the ethical climate within 
which the Police Service went about its business.   In particular, the external thrust 
of the CJC's oversight of claims of misconduct was paralleled internally by the 
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creation of an Ethical Standards Command with significant powers and direct 
access to the Commissioner.   
 
 
 
2. The Goss Government and the Criminal Justice Commission. 
 
The CJC was established as an independent statutory body which is accountable to 
a bi-partisan parliamentary committee.  It is empowered by the 1989 Act to 
investigate alleged improper behavior by police officers, state and local politicians, 
state government employees and officers employed in state-run correctional 
facilities; to oversee criminal intelligence matters and managing criminal intelligence 
with relation to major crime and organized crime; and monitor and to initiate reform 
of the Police Service and of the administration of criminal justice generally.  
 In the case of police, the CJC’s jurisdiction  allows it to take direct initiatives rather 
than relying on complaints.   ‘Misconduct’ is interpreted very broadly, so that it 
covers a wide range of improper behavior which is not necessarily illegal; as a 
result, the CJC has attracted a large volume of complaints from members of the 
public.   
 
During the 1990s, the relationships of successive Premiers and Police Ministers 
with the Chair of the CJC were often strained. The pattern was shaped partly by the 
personalities of the various Police Commissioners but even more by the diverse 
approaches and attitudes taken by successive Chairmen of the CJC.   
 
The first and most influential CJC Chair, appointed by the outgoing conservative 
government, was Max Sir Bingham.  Bingham had a distinguished career as a legal 
academic and then magistrate before entering politics and rising to be Attorney-
General and Deputy Premier in a Tasmanian Liberal Government.  The CJC 
became a new vehicle for his forceful leadership, providing as it did for a higher 
degree of power and autonomy than most ministerial or judicial positions.   
 
Bingham's efforts to expand the influence of the CJC and its somewhat draconian 
pursuit of accusations of misconduct against a wide variety of public servants, as 
well as police, created widespread but generally covert concern.   There were 
several public occasions when leading politicians and some senior bureaucrats 
complained about the unrestrained approach of the CJC in its investigations of 
complaints about official misconduct.   
 
But the aura of sanctity and invincibility derived from the folk memory of the 
Fitzgerald revelations prevented any direct confrontation.  Within the Police Service 
there was a determination to set the service's own house in order and to 
concentrate on ensuring standards of conduct did not give cause for concern by the 
CJC or the wider public. 
 
When Bingham’s term came to an end, he was replaced by a local who also had 
both judicial and academic experience.  Rob O’Regan came to the post with a 
reputation for sensitivity to human rights issues, but he and his successors had to 
operate within an organisational culture which had developed its own strong 
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characteristics.  Some of the entrenched members of the CJC saw themselves as 
white knights fighting the evils and inefficiencies of both politicians and bureaucrats.   
 
 
3.  Borbidge, the MOU and the War Between the Enquiries. 
 
A major turning point in relationships between the Criminal Justice Commission, the 
Police Service and the Government of the day came with the accession to power of 
the Borbidge coalition government in January 1996.  
 
 The trigger of this attack was a decision by the CJC to begin an inquiry into the 
secret Memorandum of Understanding between the Coalition and the Police Union 
which, inter alia, sought to reverse all the previous personnel reforms and required 
the party leaders to agreed to the sacking of a number of police officers from the 
senior executive, including the Commissioner.  As an apparent quid pro quo the 
Union funded a campaign against the Labor Party in Mundingburra, attacking their 
Law and Order platform and claiming the Service had been under-resourced under 
Labor.   
 
 
One well-placed commentator and former senior bureaucrat under Goss pointed out 
the consequences for the modernisation process: 
 
Put into practice, the clauses of the Memorandum would restrict interstate 
recruitment, provide preference for country recruits without tertiary 
qualifications, impose progression by seniority rather than merit, abolish 
competency tests and performance appraisal, slow up promotion for recent 
recruits and, most famously, sack senior officers unacceptable to the union. 
This unhappy document argues for a police service and, by extension, a public 
sector that is insular, hostile to merit and graduates, seniority-based, stable 
and secure, with close working relationships between unions and ministers, 
and political vetting of senior appointments.  It is a vision which returns to the 
worst practices of the past.5. 
 
The CJC investigation of the MOU allowed for the possibility that the Ministers and 
other politicians involved could have been guilty of misconduct, and this, in turn, 
was interpreted by them as a ‘witch hunt’ against those party to its signing.  To 
undermine the investigation, the government responded by setting up its own 
enquiry into the CJC.  The majority of the work of this latter inquiry was directed to 
examining past CJC investigations, mostly with some political flavour either 
because of the identity of the parties involved or the political nature of the complaint.   
 
This inquiry effectively interfered with the operation of the other, leading to the 
resignation of the Chairman of the MOU inquiry.  Two days after his resignation, the 
CJC initiated a report based on the evidence collected by the MOU Inquiry. The 
report by two barristers found that there was no evidence to support criminal 
                                            
5  G.Davis, ”The Great Wheel - Public Sector Futures in Canberra and Brisbane”, 
Canberra Bulletin of Public Administration, 84, May 1997, p 62. 
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charges of electoral bribery against the politicians involved. The CJC later issued a 
report in December 1996 clearing all those involved. 
 
Meanwhile, the second inquiry was also closed down.  In this case, it was closed 
down by a Supreme Court decision in response to a CJC action making accusations 
about  the bias of the one of the two commissioners, arising from his partisan public 
comments. 
 
The senior management of the Police Service also came under the scrutiny of the 
Borbidge Government.  In seeking to promote at least part of the agenda agreed 
with the police union, to roll back the Fitzgerald reforms and replacing senior 
officers, the government resuscitated the initial CJC Commissioner, Max Bingham, 
and offered a wide-ranging terms of reference as well as a broadly representative 
committee of outsiders.   It was expected that its recommendations would point to 
the need for major further changes, inferentially upholding the complaints of the 
Police Union.  While the Bingham Report delivered on generalities, it failed to find 
sufficient shortcomings warranting any attempt to undermine either the Goss era 
reforms or the senior staff who had implemented them. 
 
 
4. A  Parliamentary Watchdog to watch the CJC Watchdog watch the Police. 
 
 
The Borbidge Government was initially  more successful in its attempts to clip the 
wings of the CJC, which it regarded as getting beyond democratic control as a 
result of its powers to have a direct impact on the political process. 
 
The CJC’s independence was curtailed by providing increased powers to the 
Parliamentary Criminal Justice Committee, particularly the power to veto the 
selection of qualified legal practitioners to conduct hearings on behalf of the 
CJC.  The PCJC could now issue mandatory guidelines and policy directions 
to the CJC; order the CJC to initiate and pursue specific investigations into 
any conduct and activities of the CJC Commissioners or staff; it could inspect 
and copy all operational material (including that gathered through listening 
devices) for information purposes, and call the CJC to turn over confidential 
information when requested.  The new legislation directed the CJC to obtain 
ministerial approval to any changes in the CJC budget, internal staffing and 
remuneration arrangements, and gave ministers the power to withhold funding 
for specific investigations.   
 
In addition, a new office, a Parliamentary Commissioner, was created to act 
as a watch-dog on the CJC and enforce the powers granted to the 
Parliamentary Committee.  The Commissioner’s wide-ranging powers include 
the power to audit records and activities of the CJC and the investigation of 
complaints against the CJC which were referred to it by the Parliamentary 
Criminal Justice Committee.   Much to the chagrin of the staff, there was a 
removal of the special legal protections and privileges they had enjoyed in the 
past. 
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5.  Crime Commission and Children's Commission :  Diverse Alternatives. 
 
Another component in the attack on the CJC by the Borbidge Government was to 
organise an investigation which demonstrated that the CJC had been remiss in 
failing to attack organised crime, one of its terms of reference.  The Government 
therefore created a small, specialised body for this purpose, independent of the 
CJC.  The new Crime Commission was able to use its compulsion powers to aid 
police investigation of serious crime and rapidly developed a harmonious working 
relationship with QPS because of its sharply directed focus and sense of common 
purpose. 
 
Public and government disquiet in Queensland was soon focused more on issues of 
moral depravity - not least because organised crime tends to be much lower-profile 
and engages agencies from both state and federal governments.   A senior officer in 
the CJC was subjected to close police investigation concerning paedophilia and 
there were accusations that his own superiors had engaged in a cover-up to deny 
police access to evidence.   
 
This led to government accusations that the CJC had also been remiss in not 
dealing with issues of paedophilia as one element of misconduct by public servants, 
especially accusations against teachers.  (This was occurring simultaneously with 
startling revelations and admissions about misconduct in church-run establishments 
such as orphanages and private schools).   It was also known that a former teacher 
and former Deputy Leader of the Labor Party was under investigation for similar 
misconduct – he was subsequently convicted and is currently serving a prison 
sentence. 
 
Given this atmosphere, the Borbidge government then set up a Children's 
Commission with a highly paid permanent Commissioner and several part-time 
members.  This took over various functions from the pre-existing Department of 
Family Services as well as the Education Department, the Health Department and 
the Police.  The first Commissioner had a staunch National Party pedigree as well 
as significant periods of service in the state Education Department.   
 
Before the Commission could start to make an impact, the Commissioner was 
investigated by the CJC for misuse of his public service vehicle and abuse of his 
entitlements for accommodation costs.  Both were linked in oral and photographic 
evidence to his close affiliation with one of his office employees.  Court action 
followed on related matters and the Commissioner subsequently resigned although 
no convictions were recorded.      
 
He subsequently argued that his prosecution had been a political payback and an 
example of homophobia.    However, as the local newspaper commented in 
response to these claims,  “To some, to think the State’s first Children’s 
Commissioner of near retirement age would have a relationship with a man barely 
of legal age and would also allow him to be employed in his office is unthinkable” 
(Courier Mail , 15 September 2001) 
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6.  The CJC under Beattie 
 
 
It is too early to identify Beattie's intentions in relation to the supervisory 
arrangements for the CJC.  In his early parliamentary career, Beattie had 
distinguished himself as a supporter of the CJC when he was consigned to the 
political wilderness during the Goss era.  He served as chair of the parliamentary 
committee to which the CJC was notionally held accountable and supported its role 
as a critic of government.  
 
He now faces the reality that the CJC has made a habit of advancing its 
independence through confrontation.  He will be as inhibited as any of his 
predecessors in making changes which undermine its public standing because of 
the CJC's well-honed capacity to trade on the general public hostility towards 
politicians and its capacity to mobilise distrust of the police in particular. 
 
During Beattie’s first year in office, there was growing concern about the immunities 
conferred on the Parliamentary Commissioner, supported by the operation of the 
Parliamentary Committee to which she reported.  A newspaper, called to account by 
the Commissioner, faced the claim that the Commissioner was protected by 
parliamentary privilege and also possessed special investigatory powers permitting 
secret interrogation which effectively placed the Commissioner, like a Star 
Chamber, above the law.   
 
 As a consequence, the device intended by the National Party to bring the CJC 
more firmly under parliamentary control failed the test of public opinion – particularly 
the opinion of the media which resented the Commissioner's intrusion into their own 
affairs.  Under Beattie, the Commissioner operated only on the sidelines of 
parliamentary in-fighting and made no impact on the Police Service or the CJC.  
When the incumbent Commissioner was appointed to the District Court, the post 
was effectively put on hold. 
 
The CJC was the instrument used by Beattie to set up an inquiry into misconduct 
which had been alleged to have occurred over a decade by Labor Party politicians.  
The activities of this most recent inquiry, and its final report, claimed a few high-
profile political scalps – in the form of their disendorsement at the behest of the 
Premier and expulsion from the Party.   The issue became the reason for calling an 
early election but failed to sustain public concern.  The electorate almost 
immediately judged that the rorting of plebiscites was a minor misdemeanor, 
perhaps merely confirming public expectations about the venality and lack of virtue 
of politicians in general.  The main impact of the inquiry in a political sense was 
initially to encourage the opposition that they could for the first time fight an election 
from the moral high ground against a party patently divided about how to deal with 
its own shady past.   
 
In the longer term, Beattie was able to undertake a series of reforms to clean up 
party pre-selections and disown any dubious or illegal conduct by his colleagues.  
He was thus able to establish his long-term authority over the factions who had 
caused the problem in the first place because of their uncompromising commitment 
to fighting an internal war within the Labor Party.  
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Beattie thus saw no reason to undermine the CJC in his public comment, but rather 
to praise it for its continuing commitment to safeguarding ethical standards in public 
life.  Others were less enthusiastic, including the growing cohorts of members of all 
parties affected in various ways by its investigations and the various public 
servants, school teachers and occasionally police officers ensnared in its tangled 
nets of secrecy and innuendo.   There was also criticism of the high cost of the most 
recent inquiry (the CJC admitted to $775,000, almost certainly an under-estimate) 
and the fact that so little happened as a direct result of its findings.   The Report 
itself admitted that the Australian equivalent of the statute of limitations meant that 
proven breaches of the Electoral Act could not be prosecuted and anyway were not 
official misconduct in that those involved were not public officials or politicians at the 
time of these breaches.   
 
The main Brisbane newspaper ran an editorial suggesting the CJC had reached its 
use-by date, while speaking up in favour of the Crime Commission which had 
established a positive working relationship with the Police Service.6  This was seen 
to typify a wider opinion that the CJC had not delivered enough outcomes to justify 
its existence. 
 
In response to this sort of criticism, the CJC  made major changes in its operational 
priorities.   Resources are now to be concentrated on cases where serious official 
misconduct is alleged and there is a fair prospect of a ‘result’7; its "corruption 
prevention profile” is to be raised by expanding the Commission's corruption 
prevention, education and research activities.  It also aims to ensure its survival by 
increasing the range of educational products.8  Finally, it has begun conducting 
regular community attitudes surveys. The latter have gradually become an 
important indicator to advance claims about the agency’s success and its resource 
needs, demonstrating the utterly predictable fact that the public in general have 
even less faith in their own politicians than in the CJC.  
 
Premier Beattie had indicated one of his early post-election priorities would be to 
review and possibly rationalise the institutional effect of the National's own anti-CJC 
responses, namely the creation of the Crime Commission and the Parliamentary 
Commissioner for Criminal Justice.   
 
After months of inactivity and agency politicking for self-preservation, he appears at 
the moment to be moving to accomplish this by announcing the decision to merge 
the CJC and the Crime Commission while remaining vague about the 
implementation details.  Until these details are known, it will not be clear which of 
the dual elements will predominate in terms of organisational culture and focus of 
activities. 
 
                                            
6  Courier-Mail, March 13, 2001. 
 
7  Brereton 2000; AC 1996-1999. 
 
8  For example, practical guides to corruption prevention, newspaper on anti-corruption 
issues, public ethics and public duty training kit, interactive CD-ROM, video presentations, 
video-based resource-kit for high school etc. 
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All that is currently on the public record is an announcement in July 2001 that the 
two organisations would merge, accompanied by an assurance that "neither 
organisation would be gutted", the two Commissioners would operate "on an equal 
footing" and there would be no job losses.   Resources for research and intelligence 
gathering would be more efficiently managed.  This move was welcomed by the 
Liberal Party leader, the Queensland Bar Association and the Queensland Law 
Society.  The Bar Association spokesman noted that "historically, the Fitzgerald 
inquiry demonstrated the relationship between dishonest police and organised 
crime, so it makes sense to have the same body investigating both." (Courier Mail, 
July 11, 2001 
 
 
 
7.  Administrative Reform within the Police Service 
 
In practice, the CJC had not been the mainspring of reform and modernisation 
within the Police Service because of its involvement in these wider political 
enquiries into misconduct and attention to other agencies.  CJC enquiries when 
they were directed towards the Police tended to spend disproportionate amounts of 
time and resources on issues which acquired positive publicity for the CJC but 
lacked substance in terms of evidence, outcomes and changes to the practice of 
policing.   Recommendations tended to take little account of the resource 
implications to be borne by the QPS or the QPS’s own set of priorities. 
 
Administrative reforms of a different nature were taking place over the decade since 
1990 within the Queensland Police Service, driven by the Queensland Treasury 
implementation of ‘Managing for Outcomes’ across the Queensland public sector.  
This agenda has strong parallels with the Value For Money agenda in the United 
Kingdom.  Essentially based on a purchaser/provider model, all government 
agencies have been required to report on the ‘outputs’ they provide in response to 
the ‘inputs’ from the Government.  For some departments this exercise is relatively 
straightforward, but for policing, which is relatively seamless and also more reactive 
than planned, it is more difficult. 
 
The Queensland Police Service suggested that the Government was purchasing a 
set number of policing hours from the Service.  It has instituted a ‘Statewide Activity 
Survey’ completed by police for one week twice a year.  All allocated costings are 
based on this model.  In order to encourage problem-oriented policing, general 
policing is divided between two outputs: proactive and reactive policing.  After some 
lively debate, the Service also argued successfully for the inclusion of Ethical 
Standards and Public Accountability as one of its outputs, to be able to place 
various measures of complaints against police and their outcome on the public 
record, with annual reporting on targets and achievements. 
 
It appears to be an accepted prediction amongst criminologists that corruption runs 
on a ten-year cycle.  Those who have observed the Police Service in the years 
since Fitzgerald tend now to assume there must be corruption because the required 
ten years have passed. The past is never far away in Queensland policing.  
Recently, the police spokesman for the National Party formed common cause again 
with the Police Union, this time over complaints about police housing in rural areas 
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and staff shortages.  Then, echoing the remarks from the TV journalist which 
opened this paper, there was a concerted media campaign to rehabilitate 
Commissioner Terry Lewis, on the grounds that he had not received a fair trial.  The 
presumption seemed to be that he deserved an honoured place in history, just like 
the ageing Bjelke-Petersen, and that, like Sir Joh, he was equally deserving of his 
knighthood and his pension.   To Queenslanders' great credit, this claim was 
rejected by key figures from all parts of the political spectrum (although the Police 
Union remained studiously silent).   
 
 
EPILOGUE 
 
The key issue identified in this case study is the extent to which the activities of the 
CJC added a positive dimension to public sector virtue or whether, in Barberis’s 
terms,  the lack of discrimination  in its activities ended up stifling the public sector 
ethos. 
 
The Key Centre for Ethics, Law, Justice and Governance at Griffith University in 
Brisbane recently held a conference whose proceedings are available on the 
Centre’s web-site. (www.gu.edu/centre/kceljag).  The section devoted specifically to 
policing attracted a significant group of practitioners from all states as well as the 
usual academic suspects.  What was strikingly common among all the contributors, 
including the current Chair of the CJC and the Police Commissioner, was the need 
to recognise that corrupt behaviour is an endemic temptation within police services.  
 
 Doug Smith, formerly of the Queensland Service and currently Acting 
Commissioner in the Northern Territory suggested that corruption would be 
classified in the public policy literature as a "wicked" problem.   Its appearance on 
the wider political agenda was cyclical; for the most part it was constrained to 
manageable proportions by internal mechanisms but crises would slowly build up to 
the point where external intervention was required.   The intervention would create a 
new set of institutions and new senior management; these managers would then 
internalise the problem over time before the cyclic increase in corruption re-
commenced. 
 
A sour note was sounded by Tim Prenzler, also at the conference, who had 
published an article suggesting that  "crucial elements of the CJC's functions and 
structure have exposed it to capture…. weakness in oversight could also be related 
to the combined effects of an appeasement strategy, an overly legalistic 
organisational culture, and inadequate quality control." (Brit J Criminol (2000) 40, 
659).   Many police and outside observers would agree with some of the latter 
comments, especially the poor quality control over both research and investigations, 
but the idea of exemplifying the relationship between the CJC and the Police 
Service as "regulatory capture" seemed ludicrous to people inside both 
organisations.  The main tenor of the relationship varied between deep suspicion 
and aggressive criticism and distrust.    
 
 
Mark Findlay, writing in the Australian Quarterly  in 1994 from a NSW perspective 
where there is a similar but shorter history, raised many of the issues of public and 
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private concern about the CJC’s own dimensions of public accountability in the form 
of five dilemmas. (See end-note)  The CJC has tended to resolve those dilemmas 
in ways which were perceived to elevate the power, independence and capacity for 
survival of the organisation to the detriment of  the rights and reputation of those 
whose behaviour they sought to regulate   Too often perhaps for its long-term 
survival, the CJC seemed to be relishing its omnipotence and behaving in a highly 
political way or secretly and unco-operatively without regard to the human 
dimension    
 
Findlay argued that “accountability is as much concerned with the confirmation of 
appropriate practice as it is designed to reveal malpractice or the abuse of power… 
the difficulty lies not so much with the features and consequences of accountability, 
but how it is perceived.  For example, a control agency may see it as appropriate to 
use accountability to expose corruption, and even punish its perpetrators, but react 
in a hostile fashion at attempts at making the control process accountable.    
  
Accountability mechanisms may also adopt or employ practices similar to those 
which they would otherwise expose to criticisms.  Investigations may be 
clandestine, coercive and unresponsive to independent enquiry.  And the 
consequences of such practices may prove to be as unjust or abusive as those of 
the powers under review.”9 
 
The critics of the CJC would regard the above statements as an accurate picture. 
The court system certainly decided on at least one occasion that issues of human 
rights were ignored when the CJC undertook covert surveillance against a citizen 
whose (unproven) misbehaviour was unrelated to crime and more to political 
activism.   Public servants and outside observers agreed that  the CJC’s exercise of 
its powers was often misguided and counter-productive.   In general, the continuing 
focus on issues of official misconduct which fell short of criminal activity tended to 
weaken the CJC's credibility.   Whether it can regain this credibility with its re-
incorporation of the Crime Commission remains to be seen.   Much will depend on 
the leadership skills of whoever is put in charge, because as Maor points out, 
corruption is not just a crime problem, it is a political problem. 
 
 
 
End-note 
 
Findlay identifies five dilemmas:   
 
(1) between independence and accountability: 
 
How far can institutions of corruption control be required to account for the exercise 
of their powers -without compromising the legitimacy of their claimed 
independence? 
 
(2) between responsibility and indemnity: 
 
                                            
9 Mark Findlay, AQ, 1994. 
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How far can processes of corruption control advance their legitimacy though the 
responsible exercise of accountable power, while advertising individual indemnity as 
an investigatory tool? 
 
(3) between publicity and secrecy:  
 
How is the balance to be struck between the community interest in seeing 
corruption controlled, and the need to maximise investigative efficiency in secret? 
 
(4) between anonymity and exposure: 
 
To what extent should the punitive consequences of corruption control accompany 
each stage of exposure through investigating, and where should the rights of the 
individual gain the protection of anonymity? 
 
(5) between selectivity and total enforcement 
 
If the ideology of corruption control is total prohibition, then how can it sit with 
processes of selective enforcement mechanisms for requiring or ensuring 
accountability are suspected of punitive motivation and not considered 
complimentary to the exercise of  ‘real’ institutional function. 
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